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We propose a long-distance continuous-variable measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
(CV-MDI-QKD) protocol with discrete modulation. This kind of discrete-modulated schemes have good com-
patibility with efficient error correction code, which lead to higher reconciliation efficiency even at low signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR). Security analysis shows that the proposed protocol is secure against arbitrary collective
attacks in the asymptotic limit with proper use of decoy states. And with the using of discrete modulation,
the proposed CV-MDI-QKD protocol has simpler implementation and outperform previous protocols in terms
of achievable maximal transmission distance, which precisely solve the bottleneck of the original Gaussian-
modulated CV-MDI-QKD protocol.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] allows two distant au-
thenticated users to establish secure key through untrusted
quantum and classical channels. QKD has two main cate-
gories: one is discrete-variable (DV)QKD protocols [2–4],
and the alternative is continuous-variable (CV) QKD proto-
cols [5–8]. Compared with DVQKD protocols (such as BB84
protocol), CVQKD protocols have unique potentials of be-
ing effectively compatible with existing optical communica-
tion systems and using lower cost light sources and detectors.
In addition, CVQKD allow users to approximate the ultimate
limit of repeater-less communication, which is known as the
PLOB bound [9].
In recent decades, research on CVQKD has evolved rapidly.
The Gaussian-modulated CVQKD protocol employing coher-
ent state [6] has been theoretically proved to be secure un-
der arbitrary collective attack [10] and coherent attacks [11],
even taking finite-size regime into account [12, 13]. What’s
more, its composable security has been fully proven [14]. Fur-
thermore, this protocol has been experimentally proved to be
feasible both in laboratory [7, 15] and field tests [16]. A re-
cent demonstration of all-fiber Gaussian-modulated CVQKD
protocol has extended the secure transmission distance of
CVQKD over 100 km in the laboratory [17], which showing
its potential of being an appealing solution for metropolitan
quantum networks.
Theoretically, the security analysis of CVQKD relies on
some ideal assumptions, which is hard to satisfy in the ex-
perimental implementation [18–20]. The imperfect devices
lead to the practical security loopholes, which will be utilized
by eavesdroppers to take quantum attack strategies, such as
∗Corresponding author: huang.peng@sjtu.edu.cn
local oscillator (LO) fluctuation attack [21], calibration attack
[22], LO wavelength attack [23] and detector saturation attack
[24]. Most of these attack strategies mainly focus on the loop-
holes of the practical imperfect detectors. The attackers em-
ploy these loopholes to reduce the estimated additional noise
by manipulating the measurement results of the detector, caus-
ing Alice to overestimate the security key rate, which in turn
hides the extra noise introduced by the attack process.
In order to eliminate all the security hazard of the detec-
tor end effectively, continuous-variable measurement-device-
independent (CV-MDI) QKD has been proposed by several
groups independently [25–28]. In CV-MDI-QKD protocol,
two legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, are both senders. An
untrusted third party, Charlie, is introduced to receive quan-
tum states sent by Alice and Bob, performing Bell-State Mea-
surement (BSM) and communicating the measurement result
to generate the secure keys. Since the measurement part of
the protocol is performed by an untrusted third party, the se-
curity of the protocol no longer counts on the perfect detector.
Therefore, CV-MDI-QKD can remove all known or unknown
side-channel attacks on detectors, which means higher prac-
tical security. In recent years, several significant results have
been achieved in the theoretical research field of CV-MDI-
QKD [29–36].
Unfortunately, in practical implementation, the maximal
transmission distance of CV-MDI-QKD is unsatisfactory [28].
One of the key problems is that the reconciliation efficiency β
is quite low for Gaussian-modulated protocols in the case of
long distance transmission with low signal-to-noise ratio. The
best error correction codes presently available, such as LDPC
codes [37] or turbo codes, work well with discrete (e.g. bi-
nary) value under low SNR condition, but have poor perfor-
mance with continuous (e.g. Gaussian-modulated) value un-
der the same condition.
In order to solve this problem, many efforts are being ded-
icated. The mainstream approach is to programming an error
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FIG. 1: (Color online). Schematic diagram of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with discrete modulation. |Ψ4〉A1A2 and |Ψ4〉B1B2 are all two-mode
squeezed states. Het is heterodyne detection. Hom is homodyne detection. D(β) is displacement operation
correction code with higher efficiency under low SNR condi-
tions. This approach is consistent with the way to solve this
problem in one-way protocol, such as the code proposed in
[38], which can be combined with a multidimensional rec-
onciliation scheme [39] and work well in the regime of low
SNR. However, this type of error correction codes is designed
and implemented with high complexity, and the cost of hard-
ware required is high. What’s more, the probability that such
codes will succeed in achieving high reconciliation efficiency
is quite low [38].
Interestingly, it has been found that the discrete modu-
lation, such as four-state modulation, allows for a much
better reconciliation efficiency at low SNR, which lead to
longer transmission distance in CVQKD protocol [40, 41].
In discrete-modulated protocols [40–42], the senders prepare
a certain number of nonorthogonal coherent states (for four-
state scheme, the number is four), and exploit the sign of
measured quadratures of each state to encode the bits of se-
cret key rate, while the Gaussian-modulated protocols exploit
the quadratures itself to encode information. The sign of
measured quadratures is already discrete values, which works
well with high efficient error correction codes even at low
SNR. The discrete-modulated protocols are particularly suited
in long-distance transmission, whereas they are hard to ob-
tain high key rate at short distance. Surprisingly, a recent
work [43] shows the 256 modes discrete-modulated proto-
col is able to obtain almost the same high key rate with the
Gaussian-modulated protocol. Furthermore, discrete modu-
lation is more convenient for experimental implementation
and specific operation than Gaussian modulation. Inspired by
the aforementioned advantages, we propose a CV-MDI-QKD
protocol by employing discrete modulation, which could ap-
parent extent the maximal transmission distance of CV-MDI-
QKD protocol without taking additional security vulnerabil-
ity.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II, we first in-
troduce the original CV-MDI-QKD protocol, then introduce
the model of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with discrete mod-
ulation and the use of decoy states. In Sec. III, we derive the
secret key of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with discrete mod-
ulation. In Sec. IV,we give the numerical simulation and per-
formance analysis. Conclusion and discussion are drawn in
Sec. V.
II. CV-MDI-QKD PROTOCOLWITH DISCRETE
MODULATION
In this section, we first review the CV-MDI-QKD protocol,
especially the entanglement-based (EB) version. Then, we
present the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with discrete modulation.
In addition, we introduce the use of decoy states for CV-MDI-
QKD protocol with discrete modulation, which guarantee the
security of this protocol.
A. CV-MDI-QKD Protocol
Generally, for CV-MDI-QKD protocol, the prepare-and-
measure (PM) version is applied to implementation in prac-
tice as it is easy to apply, while the equivalent EB version is
used for security analysis. The construction of CV-MDI-QKD
protocol is illustrated in Fig. 1. The main steps of EB version
can be depicted as follows:
Step 1: Alice and Bob prepare two-mode squeezed states
|Ψ4〉A1A2 and |Ψ4〉B1B2 , independently. ModeA1 andB1 are
retained by Alice and Bob respectively, and mode A2 and B2
are sent to an untrusted third part Charlie through the quantum
channel with length LAC and LBC , respectively.
Step 2: After receive modes A′ and B′, Charlie interferes
the two modes at a beam splitter (BS) and get two output
modes C and D. After the x quadrature of mode C and p
quadrature of mode D are measured by homodyne detections,
3Charlie announced the measurement results {XC , PD} pub-
licly.
Step 3: Bob uses the received measurement results to mod-
ifies mode B1 through displacement operation D(β) and ob-
tains
ρB′1 = D (β) ρB1D
† (β) , (1)
where ρB1 is the density matrix of mod B1 , β =
g (XC + iPD), and g is the gain of the displacement.
Through heterdyne detection, Bob measures mode B′1 to get
{XB , PB}, and Alice measures mode A1 to get {XA, PA}.
Step 4: Alice and Bob implement parameter estimation, in-
formation reconciliation and privacy amplification, finally ob-
taining a string of secret key.
Through the BSM and Bob’s displacement operation,
modes modes A1 and B′1 are entangled [44], and {XB , PB}
and {XA, PA} are correlated.
In the PM scheme, Alice and Bob prepare coherent states
independently and send them to Charlie for BSM. After Char-
lie announce the measurement results, Bob modifies his data
according to the measurement results, while Alice keeps her
data unchanged. There is no displacement operation for Bob
in the PM scheme. Alice and Bob extract a string of secret
key by using parameter estimation, information reconciliation
and privacy amplification.
B. Discrete modulation in CV-MDI-QKD
In CV-MDI-QKD protocol with discrete modulation, Alice
and Bob perform discrete modulation operations simultane-
ously. For the sake of specificity and simplicity, we mainly
focus on four-state scheme [40, 42]. In this scheme, the
modulated coherent states consist of four types:
∣∣αeipi/4〉,∣∣αe3ipi/4〉, ∣∣αe−3ipi/4〉, and ∣∣αe−ipi/4〉, where α is a positive
number related to the modulation variance of coherent states.
The four types are shown in Fig. 1. The modulation variance
of coherent state is VM = 2α2.
First, we consider the discrete modulation operation in Al-
ice. In PM version, the mixture state ρA4 , which is send by
Alice to Charlie through the quantum channel, is given by
ρA4 =
1
4
3∑
k=0
∣∣α4k〉 〈α4k∣∣ . (2)
In EB version, the two-mode squeezed state prepares by Al-
ice is |Ψ4〉A1A2 , and the variances of the quadrature compo-
nents of the two modes A1 and A2 are all VA. The two-mode
squeezed state prepares by Bob is |Ψ4〉B1B2 , and the variances
of the quadrature components of the two modesB1 andB2 are
all VB , and VA = VB = 1+VM . The modes of |Ψ4〉A1A2 and|Ψ4〉B1B2 is illustrated in Fig. 1.the two-mode entangled state
prepares by Alice is
|Ψ4〉A1A2 =
3∑
k=0
√
λk
∣∣φAk 〉 ∣∣φAk 〉 = 12
3∑
k=0
|ψk〉A1
∣∣α4k〉A2 ,
(3)
where the non-Gaussian states |ψk〉A1 is given by
|ψk〉A1 =
1
2
3∑
m=0
ei(1+2k)mpi/4
∣∣φAm〉, (4)
with m ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and
∣∣φAk 〉 = 1
e
α2
2
√
λk
∞∑
n=0
(−1)n α
4n+k√
(4n+ k)!
|4n+ k〉, (5)
for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, and
λ0,2 =
1
2eα2
[
cosh
(
α2
)± cos (α2)] ,
λ1,3 =
1
2eα2
[
sinh
(
α2
)± sin (α2)] . (6)
As the PM version is equivalent to the EB vision for this
protocol, the mixture state ρ4 can be calculated as
ρA4 = Tr
(|Ψ4〉A1A2 〈Ψ4|A1A2) = 3∑
k=0
λk
∣∣φAk 〉 〈φAk ∣∣ . (7)
The covariance matrix γA1A2 of the bipartite state |Ψ4〉A1A2
can be expressed by
γA1A2 =
 XI2 Z4σz
Z4σz Y I2
 , (8)
where I2 is 2× 2 identity matrix, σz = diag(1,−1), and
X = 〈Ψ4| 1 + a†1a1 |Ψ4〉 = 1 + 2α2,
Y = 〈Ψ4| 1 + a†2a2 |Ψ4〉 = 1 + 2α2,
Z4 = 〈Ψ4| a1a2 + a†1a†2 |Ψ4〉 = 2α2
3∑
k=0
λ
3/2
k−1λ
−1/2
k .
(9)
Similarly, we set the modulation variance in Bob is still
VM = 2β
2 = 2α2, and the two output modes of the bipar-
tite state |Ψ4〉B1B2 are B1 and B2. As Alice and Bob perform
the same discrete modulation, the covariance matrix γB1B2 of
|Ψ4〉B1B2 is the same as γA1A2 . Displacement operation does
not affect the covariance matrix.
To summarize, in PM version of our protocol, Alice ran-
domly prepares four nonorthogonal coherent states and send
one of them to Charlie, Bob randomly prepares another four
nonorthogonal coherent states and send one of them to Char-
lie. After Charlie performs the BSM on the received two states
and announced the measurement results, Alice keeps her sign
of quadratures and Bob modifies his sign based on these re-
sults. In EB version of our protocol, when Alice performs
projection measurement on mode A1, she only discriminates
which coherent state is sent to Charlie, which shows the sign
of quadratures of the state. And Bob performs projection mea-
surement on mode B′1 to get the sign of quadratures, which is
associated with the sign obtained by Alice. Both the PM ver-
sion and EB version use the signs of measured quadratures of
states to extract a string of secret key.
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FIG. 2: (Color online). Equivalent one-way protocol of the CV-MDI-
QKD protocol with discrete modulation in EB version, where Eve is
aware of Charlie, channels, the two-mode squeezed state |Ψ4〉B1B2
and the displacement operation D(β).
C. Decoy states
In EB version of the our protocol, Alice (Bob) performs the
projection measurement, which just makes Alice (or Bob) to
discriminate which state is sent to Charlie, but not aware of the
quadratures of her (his) quantum mode. Therefore, the two le-
gitimate users cannot use these experimental data to construct
the covariance matrix of the mixed state ρAB without the lin-
ear channel assumption (LCA) [42]. In other words, LCA is a
necessary condition for the security of the protocol.
In order to solve this problem, we introduce decoy states to
modify our protocol, which refer to the idea of A. Leverrier et
al. [41]. The use of decoy state can be expressed as
pσkey + (1− p)σdecoy = σG, (10)
where σkey is the states used for the key distillation, σdecoy is
the decoy states, and p is a weight between 0 and 1. σG is the
states satisfying Gaussian distribution and meeting
pestσest + (1− pest)σG = σAll, (11)
where σest is the states used for parameter estimation, σAll
are all the states sent through quantum channel. σest and σAll
are all follow Gaussian distribution. pest denote the fraction
of σest. In practice, Alice randomly prepares σAkey , σ
A
decoy
and σAest with probability p(1 − pest), (1 − p)(1 − pest) and
pest respectively. The three types of states can be given as
σAkey =
∫
pkey (α) |α〉 〈α|dα,
σAdecoy =
∫
pdecoy (α) |α〉 〈α|dα,
σAest =
∫
pest (α) |α〉 〈α|dα,
(12)
where the probability distribution pkey (α) is chosen as p(1−
pest), pedcoy (α) is chosen as(1 − p)(1 − pest) and pest (α)
is chosen as pest. Obviously, the mixed state sent by Al-
ice to Charlie is Gaussian, denoted as σAAll. Bob prepares a
Gaussian state σBAll and sends it to Charlie through quantum
channel, taking BSM with σAAll. After these quantum pro-
cess, Alice tell Bob p, pest and which state is σAkey , σ
A
decoy or
σAest ,through the classical channel. Then Alice and Bob can
establish secure keys through our protocol without LCA. In
addition, the use of decoy states can also eliminate the vul-
nerability exploited by state-discrimination attack [45], since
the discrimination receiver is noneffective for Gaussian states
and Eve cannot distinguish whether the state is σkey , σdecoy
or σest. Otherwise, this method still has certain defects. In
practice, these operations will increase the complexity of the
system, and the decoy states is hard to be precisely prepared.
III. CALCULATION OF THE SECRET KEY RATE
In this section, we mainly focus on the secret key rate un-
der collective attacks, since they are optimal in the asymptotic
limit. The EB scheme of CV-MDI-QKD protocol can be con-
verted into a common one-way CVQKD protocol, where we
assume that the two-mode squeezed state |Ψ4〉B1B2 and the
displacement operation D(β) are untrusted. The equivalent
one-way protocol is shown in Fig. 2. We denote the secure
key rate of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with discrete modula-
tion and the equivalent one-way protocol areKDM andKone,
respectively. It is obvious that KDM ≥ Kone. Hence, the
lower bound of KDM can be estimated by using similar co-
variance matrix of the equivalent one-way protocol. In PM
version of our protocol, the quantum states sent by Alice and
Bob are all non-Gaussian states. According to the optimality
of Gaussian attack [46], we can use the method of calculat-
ing secret key rate under collective Gaussian attacks to get the
low bound of the secret key rate of our protocol under col-
lective attacks. In order to facilitate the analysis, we use the
method of calculating Kone under collective Gaussian attacks
to obtain KDM .
In addition, we assume the quantum channels from Alice
to Charlie and Bob to Charlie are two independent Markovian
memoryless Gaussian quantum channels [47]. This assump-
tion is based on that the two quantum channels are come from
different directions in practical CV-MDI-QKD system, which
means that the ambient noise of the two channels should have
weak connection. Under this assumption, the optimal col-
lective Gaussian attack is taking entangling cloner attacks on
each quantum channel independently [10, 26]. The following
calculation and simulation are all based on this attack strategy.
The excess noise and the transmittance of the quantum
channel between Alice (Bob) and Charlie are εA (εB) and ηA
(ηB). We set both quantum channel losses are l = 0.2 dB/km,
then the transmittance can be given as ηA = 10
−lLAC
10 , ηB =
10
−lLBC
10 . ε refers to the equivalent excess noise of the equiv-
alent one-way protocol, which can be calculated as
ε = 1 + χA +
TB
TA
(χB − 1)
+ηBηA
(√
2
ηBg2
√
VB − 1−
√
VB + 1
)2
,
(13)
where χA = 1ηA −1+εA, χB = 1ηB −1+εB , g is the gain of
the displacement operation in Bob. We adopt g2 = 2(VB−1)ηB(VB+1)
to minimize ε, then we obtain
ε = ηBηA (χB − 1) + 1 + χA
= ηBηA (εB − 2) + εA + 2TA .
(14)
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FIG. 3: (Color online). Secret key rates as a function of VM in the
extreme asymmetric case. Transmission distances D = LAC are set
to 15 km, 20 km, 25 km and 30 km. N0 is the shot noise variance.
Parameters are fixed as follows: excess noise εA = εB = 0.002,
reconciliation efficiency β = 90%.
We suppose the homodyne detectors in Charlie are ideal ap-
paratuses, then the total channel-added noise expressed in shot
noise units is χt = 1η − 1 + ε, where η = ηAg
2
2 is a normal-
ized parameter which is associated with the quantum channel
transmittance of the equivalent one-way protocol [26].
After the BSM and displacement operation, the covariance
matrix of ρDMA1B′1 is given as
γDM
A1B′1 =
 aI2 cσz
cσz bI2
 =
 XI2 √ηZ4σz√
ηZ4σz η (Y + χt) I2
 , (15)
where X ,Y and Z are given in Eq. (9), I2 is 2 × 2 identity
matrix, σz = diag(1,−1).
The secure key rate of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with dis-
crete modulation under reverse reconciliation can be calcu-
lated as
KDM = βI
DM
AB − χDMBE , (16)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is the reconciliation efficiency, IDMAB is the
Shannon mutual information between Alice and Bob, χDMBE is
the Holevo quantity [48] between Bob and Eve. IDMAB can be
calculated by [49]
IDMAB = 2×
1
2
log2
VAM
VAM |BM
, (17)
where VAM |BM = VAM − c
2
4VBM
, VAM = (a+ 1)/2 , VBM =
(b+ 1)/2, then
IDMAB = log2
(
a+ 1
a+ 1− c2/(b+ 1)
)
. (18)
The Holevo quantity χDMBE can be obtained as follows [49]
χDMBE = S(E)− S(E|B)
= S(A1B
′
1)− S(A1|B′1),
(19)
where S(A1B′1) is a function of the symplectic eigenvalues
κ1,2 of γDMA1B′1 , and S(A1|B′1) is a function of the symplectic
eigenvalues κ3 of γ
mB′1
A1
, and
S(A1B
′
1) = G[(κ1 − 1)/2] +G[(κ2 − 1)/2],
S(A1|B′1) = G[(κ3 − 1)/2],
(20)
where the Von Neumann entropy
G (x) = (x+ 1) log2(x+ 1)− xlog2x. (21)
The symplectic eigenvalues λ1,2 can be calculated by
κ21,2 =
1
2
(
A±
√
A2 − 4B2
)
, (22)
with the notations
A = a2 + b2 − 2c2 = X2 + η2(Y + χt)2 − 2ηZ24 ,
B = ab− c2 = η (XY +Xχt − Z24) . (23)
The covariance matrix γ
mB′1
A1
is given by
γ
mB′1
A1
= aI2 − cσz(bI2 + I2)−1cσz
= [a− c2/(b+ 1)]I2.
(24)
Then the symplectic eigenvalues κ3 is obtained as
κ3 = a− c2/(b+ 1) = X − ηZ24/[η(Y + χt) + 1]. (25)
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we show the performance of CV-MDI-QKD
protocol with discrete modulation compared with the original
CV-MDI-QKD protocol. It has been proven that the configu-
ration with the optimal performance for CV-MDI-QKD pro-
tocol is the extreme asymmetric case [28], where Charlie in-
finitely close to Bob. In our analysis, we are mainly concerned
about this case. In this case, LBC = 0, the transmission dis-
tance is equal to LAC .
The modulation variance VM is a parameter that will pro-
foundly affect the performance of the prorosed protocol. In
order to extract the optimal secret key rate, we plot the secret
key rates as a function of the modulation variance VM with
different transmission distance in extreme asymmetric case,
which is shown Fig. 3. It is obvious that the optional areas
of VM are gradually compressed when transmission distance
increases, and the secret key rate decreases evidently with the
increase of transmission distance. The practicable VM values
of our protocol are quite low than the original CV-MDI-QKD
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FIG. 4: (Color online). Secret key rates as a function of the transmis-
sion distance in the extreme asymmetric case, where LBC = 0. The
thin solid lines denote the discrete-modulated CV-MDI-QKD proto-
col, the dashed lines denote the Gaussian-modulated CV-MDI-QKD
protocol. The uppermost heavy solid line denotes the PLOB bound.
The various parameters are the excess noises εA = εB = 0.002
[upper (black) lines] or εA = εB = 0.003 [lower (red) lines]. The
modulation variance of Gaussian-modulated protocol and discrete-
modulated protocol are 0.4 and 40, respectively. Reconciliation effi-
ciency β = 90%.
protocol, which means that the quantum signals in our pro-
tocol have fewer photons. Under different transmission dis-
tance, the security key rate always have the peak value when
VM is about 0.4. In other words, the optimal value of VM is
about 0.4. In the following analysis, we set VM of our proto-
col is 0.4, which leads to the optimal performance.
The plot of Fig. 4 shows the secret key rates as a function
of the transmission distance in the extreme asymmetric case,
for both discrete-modulated CV-MDI-QKD protocol and orig-
inal Gaussian-modulated one, with different excess noise. The
CV-MDI-QKD protocol with discrete modulation is denoted
by the thin solid lines, the original CV-MDI-QKD protocol
with Gaussian modulation is denoted by the dashed lines,
and the PLOB bound [9], which gives the ultimate limit of
repeater-less quantum communication, is denoted by the up-
permost heavy solid line. The modulation variance VM of
both protocols are all the values used in practical operations,
which present the optimal performance of each protocol under
practical conditions. [26].
It seems clear that the maximum transmission distance of
discrete-modulated CV-MDI-QKD protocol is always longer
than that of the original Gaussian-modulated one under both
excess noises. Compared with the original CV-MDI-QKD
protocol, the discrete modulation combined with CV-MDI-
QKD protocol can obviously extend the maximum transmis-
sion distance, which can effectively expand the scope of ap-
plication of such protocols. Moreover, when the transmis-
sion distance is longer than 21.7 km with the excess noise
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FIG. 5: (Color online). Secret key rates as a function of reconcil-
iation efficiency β in the asymmetric case. Transmission distance
denotes as D = LAC . DM protocol denotes the CV-MDI-QKD pro-
tocol with discrete modulation, and GM protocol denotes the orig-
inal CV-MDI-QKD protocol with Gaussian modulation. Parame-
ters are fixed as follows: excess noise εA = εB = 0.002. The
modulation variance of Gaussian-modulated protocol and discrete-
modulated protocol are 0.4 and 40, respectively.
εA = εB = 0.002 (or 21.1 km with the excess noise εA =
εB = 0.003), the performance of discrete-modulated CV-
MDI-QKD protocol is much closer to the PLOB bound than
that of the original Gaussian-modulated CV-MDI-QKD proto-
col, and the performance gap between the two protocols will
become larger and larger with the increase of transmission dis-
tance. As the discrete-modulated protocol works well with
efficient error correction code in reconciliation process, even
in extremely low SNR conditions [40], the maximal transmis-
sion distance of the discrete-modulated CV-MDI-QKD pro-
tocol can be much longer than that of original Gaussian-
modulated CV-MDI-QKD protocol in practice.
There is a phenomenon that deserves our attention: within
a shorter transmission distance, the performance of the CV-
MDI-QKD protocols with discrete modulation is worse than
that of original CV-MDI-QKD protocol. This case is caused
by the lower modulation variance of the quantum signal in
discrete-modulated CV-MDI-QKD protocol (almost below 1
units of shot noise ), which leads to the secret key rate of
discrete-modulated protocol is much lower than the original
one in the condition of low-channel-loss. In addition, as
shown in the figure 4 , when the excess noise increases, the
secret key rate of discrete-modulated CV-MDI-QKD proto-
col decreases faster than that of the original CV-MDI-QKD
protocol. This means that our protocol is more sensitive to
the excess noise. The reason for this phenomenon is that the
quantum signal intensity and the SNR in discrete-modulated
CV-MDI-QKD protocol is much lower than these of origi-
nal CV-MDI-QKD protocol. However, these defects can be
corrected effectively with the participation of noiseless linear
7amplifier. Otherwise, Z. Li et al. have proved that discrete-
modulated coherent state protocol with 256 modes can reach
the high secret key rate almost the same as Gaussian modula-
tion case [43].
Fig. 5 depicts a performance comparison of the CV-MDI-
QKD protocol with discrete modulation and the original CV-
MDI-QKD protocol with Gaussian modulation for different
reconciliation efficiency β in the extreme asymmetric case,
where LBC = 0. VM of both protocols are all the ones pro-
vide optimal performance in practice, which is the same as the
VM in Fig. 4.
For the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with discrete modulation,
the usable range of β narrows with the increase of transmis-
sion distance. When the transmission distance are 20km, the
secret key rate of the CV-MDI-QKD protocols with discrete
modulation are lower than that of the original CV-MDI-QKD
protocol when the reconciliation efficiency β values in 0.892
to 1. This is also caused by the lower quantum signal mod-
ulation variance in discrete modulation. Nevertheless, with
β decrease, the secret key rate of the original protocol de-
crease faster than that of the protocol with discrete modu-
lation. When β is lower than 0.892, the secret key rate of
the protocols with discrete modulation get higher than that
of the original one. Moreover, the original CV-MDI-QKD
protocol will have no secret key when β is lower than 0.889,
but the lower bound of β to obtaining secret key for the CV-
MDI-QKD protocols with discrete modulation is 0.761. All
this means the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with discrete modula-
tion are more tolerant of the reconciliation efficiency. What’s
more, the protocol with discrete modulation have better com-
bination with efficient error correction code. This will further
widen the performance gap between our protocol and the orig-
inal CV-MDI-QKD protocol over long-distance transmission.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced a CV-MDI-QKD proto-
col with discrete modulation, which can obviously improve
the maximal transmission distance. We focus on the analysis
of four-state scheme as the representative of discrete modu-
lation scheme. The security of this protocol under arbitrary
collective attacks is established with the appropriate use of
decoy states. The discrete-modulated CV-MDI-QKD proto-
col have commendable cooperation with efficient reconcilia-
tion error correction codes, even in extremely low SNR con-
ditions, which leads to longer secure transmission distance.
This property exactly right remedies the defect in the trans-
mission distance of CV-MDI-QKD protocol. The secret key
rate simulation results under the asymptotic case shows that
the proposed protocol has obvious advantages over the origi-
nal Gaussian-modulated CV-MDI-QKD protocol in maximal
transmission distance, even with the same reconciliation effi-
ciency. What’s more, compared with the original Gaussian-
modulated CV-MDI-QKD protocol, the experimental imple-
mentation of our protocol is more simple and convenient in
practice.
In the above analysis, Charlie’s homodyne detectors are as-
sumed to be perfect, where the electronic noise υel of ho-
modyne detector is 0 and the quantum efficiency ηhom of
homodyne detector is 1. However, the practical homodyne
detectors in Charlie are not the always ideal apparatuses.
We express the detection-added noise in shot noise units as
χhom = [υel + (1− ηhom)] /ηhom. The total noise referred
to the channel input with imperfect detectors can be calcu-
lated as χ′t = χt + 2χhom/ηA. Obviously, the imperfection
of the detectors will great increase the total noise. Since the
quantum signal intensity of our protocol is much lower than
these of the original Gaussian-modulated one, our protocol is
more sensitive to the total noise and, especially, the imper-
fection of the detectors. But fortunately, through the rational
use of noiseless linear amplifier and state-discrimination de-
tection, we will significantly improve the robustness of our
protocol to the imperfections of detectors. Moreover, it would
be meaningful to improve the initial secret key rate of the pro-
posed protocol and carry out the experimental implementation
in further research.
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